In the American context, research on ambivalence established that individuals often simultaneously possess positive and negative considerations on a political object. Yet, little is known about ambivalence in support for European integration. This article proposes a measure that distinguishes ambivalence from indifference in attitudes towards the EU. Using data from Eurobarometer wave 63.4 and the Chapel Hill expert survey I find that the causal logics of ambivalence and indifference are sharply different. Multinomial regression analysis reveals that levels of ambivalence towards the EU increase with political sophistication. Also, citizens are more ambivalent, less indifferent, and less positive about the EU when elite division on European integration is more pronounced. Finally, trust in EU institutions and attachment to Europe decrease indifference and ambivalence about the EU.
Introduction
In studies of EU public opinion, the dependent variable is typically conceptualized as one-dimensional -i.e. as a continuum from low support to high support for the unification of Europe. This disguises a central aspect of belief systems, namely, that individual opinions are often simultaneously positive and negative.
Rather than endorsing one side and refuting the other, many citizens embrace elements of both sides. In research on American public opinion, individuals with competing considerations relevant to one and the same object are considered ambivalent. This study has two goals. First, I suggest a measure that accounts for critical differences in attitudes towards the European Union. The measure distinguishes between indifference, ambivalence, and univalent views. Second, I
propose and test a theoretical framework to explain ambivalence in public notions of the EU. Recent work has shown that ambivalence is not only distinct from indifference, but has nontrivial implications for the processing of political information and preference formation. Attitudes marked by ambivalence are held with less certainty, are retrieved from memory with more difficulty and, overall, tend to be less stable over time (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 2000; Zaller, 1992) . Most notably, attitudes characterized by ambivalence are more vulnerable to persuasion than one-sided views (Bassili, 1996) and they are more likely to be driven by whatever considerations are momentarily salient, so that context and cues become more relevant (Lavine et al., 1998; Tourangeau et al., 1989) . Thus, the extent of ambivalence among Europeans is relevant in order to understand public opinion towards European integration, the success of extreme right-or left wing parties in European Parliament elections or EU referendum campaigns (e.g. Taggart, 1998; De Vries and Edwards, 2009; Hobolt and Brouard, 2011) . Hobolt (2009) , for instance, demonstrates in an elaborate framework how an individual's level of support for European integration affects voting behavior in EU referendums. Consequently, better information on the structure of EU public opinion can extend our knowledge on other political processes. Evidence from the US would suggest that in contrast to individuals with univalent attitudes, EU citizens with ambivalent attitudes are more likely to be influenced by EU level events that garner high media attention or the arguments made by elites during EU related campaigns.
In the next section, I conceptualize ambivalent attitudes vis-à-vis unambivalent opinions. Then, I present a theoretical argument that links cue availability and cue competition to individual level ambivalence in views of the EU. Using
Eurobarometer data, I show that the availability of cognitive cues on the EU increases ambivalence while decreasing indifference. Competing elite cues also intensify ambivalence and diminish levels of public indifference. On the contrary, affective cues reduce both levels of indifference and ambivalence among EU citizens. The results, for instance, elucidate a sharp difference between those who view the EU positively and those who are ambivalent, for it is the ambivalent that have a weak emotional involvement with the community. I conclude that the often-cited idea of a public dissensus on European integration is correct (Hooghe and Marks 2009 ), but needs revision. Rather than describing only the aggregate level, a dissensus is what a significant share of Europeans experience on an individual level when forming their opinions about the EU. I address the theoretical implications of this finding and avenues for future research in a final section.
Mapping ambivalence and its consequences
There are two conceptualizations of ambivalence in the literature: First, ambivalence as a conflict of core beliefs, and, second, as a coexistence of positive and negative evaluations on a single object. According to the first understanding, citizens are only considered ambivalent when their answers on a policy question are instable due to a conflict of their core beliefs. Alvarez and Brehm (1995) give the example of a woman who exhibits ambivalence in her attitude towards abortion policies due to the strong beliefs she holds for both women's rights as well as respect for human life.
Most research in political science employs a broader notion of ambivalence that is rooted in social psychology (e.g. Zaller, 1992; Lavine, 2001 ). According to this broader notion, ambivalence is the simultaneous endorsement of positive and negative evaluations with respect to an issue or object. Steenbergen and Brewer (2004) reconcile the two approaches and note that a conflict of core beliefs is a particular manifestation of ambivalence. I follow the broader notion of the concept, so that ambivalence is the presence of positive and negative considerations for the EU, while indifference is characterized by the absence of both kinds of considerations. A twodimensional space clearly maps the viewpoint of ambivalent Europeans (cf. Cacioppo, Gardner, and Bernston 1997) and shows their conceptual distinctiveness from individuals who are indifferent about the EU.
< Table 1 about here >
The effects of attitudinal ambivalence are well documented in the American context. However, in the European context little is known about ambivalence.
Ambivalence, for instance, has repeatedly been found to decrease the predictability of political attitudes (for an overview, see Steenbergen and Brewer 2004) . This is closely linked to an ambivalent respondent's greater difficulty in making a political choice.
Also, ambivalence increases an individual's dependence on information that is salient at a specific point in time. Alvarez and Brehm examine these effects on US citizens' positions towards abortion policies (1995) 
Sources of ambivalence
The public opinion literature provides diverse and, at times, contradictory explanations of ambivalence. Addressing this literature, I develop a theoretical framework that explains ambivalence as a dimension of EU public opinion. At the center of my framework is a theory of cognitive and affective cues. Cognitive cues on the EU involve EU specific knowledge, political cues from the news media, and cues on the EU sent by parties. On the other hand, feelings of attachment to Europe and trust in EU institutions are treated as affective cues, which influence citizens' views of the EU in a distinct but similar fashion to cognitive cues.
To develop my framework, I built on approaches proposed by Zaller (1992) as well as Steenbergen and De Vries (2012) .
3 However, these authors primarily focus on cognitive cues. Since it is a well-established observation in social psychology that attitudes are driven both by cognitive assessments as well as affect (e.g. Breckler and
Wiggins 1989), I extend existing explanations of ambivalence to include affective sources. I present the cognitive cue centered approaches by Zaller (1992) as well as Steenbergen and De Vries (2012) in the next sections before addressing affective cues.
Zaller's (1992) model on the relation between cognitive cues and political attitudes differentiates between three types of individuals: politically sophisticated citizens, politically unsophisticated citizens, and citizens in between those poles, who make up the majority of the population. Political sophistication refers to the level of attention citizens pay to politics and the extent to which they comprehend political information. Thus, the concept of political sophistication is about the degree to which citizens absorb political cues. Zaller (1992) shows that individuals with low political sophistication are unlikely to be ambivalent about political issues due to their inattention to politics and lack of knowledge about competing political cues.
Politically sophisticated citizens are also low in ambivalence, although for different reasons. Zaller (1992) notes that very politically sophisticated citizens are able to assess and reject counter attitudinal messages right away and are thus driven by a coherent set of considerations. He theorizes that all other citizens are expected to be ambivalent. That is because most citizens somewhat follow political news and have some political skills, but are not able to reject all political cues in opposition with their own views. These citizens accept and store numerous competing considerations on political issues, which makes ambivalence more likely to occur.
The account offered by Zaller (1992) is tailored to the political environment in the United States, especially its two party system. In most European countries, more than two political parties send cues on European integration. Except for cues from extreme right wing parties, political cues are often not aimed for or against the EU, but show more subtle differences. Like Zaller (1992) , Steenbergen and De Vries (2012) conceptualize public opinion as a cueing process in which citizens rely on cues to form opinions. However, Steenbergen and De Vries (2012) factor in the specificities of European public opinion formation. For instance, they examine the effect of different cognitive cues separately, such as EU knowledge, news media cues on the EU, and party dissent on European integration. In contrast to Zaller (2012) , the authors find that regardless of the level of political sophistication, competing cues always lead to ambivalence. By the same token, they argue that "the clearer the cues are, the better able will the person be to form a coherent attitude and the less variable his or her expressed opinions will be" (Steenbergen and De Vries, 2012: 6) .
Steenbergen and De Vries (2012) thus do not find that politically sophisticated citizens -i.e. those with considerable knowledge about the EU -are less ambivalent because they are able to reject competing cues. On the contrary, there is evidence for a positive relationship between cognitive cue availability and ambivalence.
Steenbergen and De Vries (2012) find that greater EU news media salience increases response variation, their indicator of ambivalence. This supports the notion that an increased emphasis on the EU by news media brings about a surge in the provision of competing cues, which, in turn, contributes to public ambivalence. Steenbergen and De Vries (2012) conclude that the salience of dissonant cognitive cues is an important trigger of ambivalence.
In contrast to Steenbergen and De Vries (2012) , I argue that the lowest levels of political sophistication and a complete lack of cues on the EU cause indifference rather than ambivalence. An individual lacking any sort of cues is unlikely to be torn between two sides regarding the EU. Additionally, it is hypothesized that cognitive cue availability decreases the prevalence of univalent views on the EU and increases ambivalence regarding the EU. On the one hand, cognitive cues are expected to make seeing the EU in a positive view less likely, and in turn, ambivalence more widespread. I expect this because acquiring an abundance of cognitive cues makes it more likely for citizens to hold cues that are in opposition with each other. On the other hand, the literature provides much evidence that a better understanding of European integration makes a negative view of the EU less common (Inglehart, 1970; Inglehart, Rabier and Reif, 1987; Janssen, 1991) . Another important source of cognitive cues regarding the EU are political parties since politics of European integration are often very technical in nature and the implications of many policies for an individual's personal life can be difficult to assess (e.g. Franklin, Marsh, McLaren, 1994; Ray, 2003 As mentioned before, social psychology highlights that attitudes are driven by cognitive assessments as well as affect. In fact, evidence even suggests a supremacy of affect over cognition, particularly when cognitive cues are unavailable or inconclusive (Lavine et al., 1998a) . Affective reactions can often be accessed more easily and more quickly than cognitive information (Zajonc, 1984) . In many instances, affective responses to an object are perceived as more subjectively valid and linked more closely to one's self than cognitive cues (Lavine et al., 1998a) .
Hence, the cognitive cue centered model is extended to also include affective cues. I
argue that the availability of affective cues is critical for citizens' views of the EU.
Among the different types of affect influencing public attitudes towards European integration, I focus on two key concepts, namely trust in EU institutions and attachment to Europe (McLaren, 2004; McLaren, 2007; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler; 2003; Karp and Bowler, 2006; Marks 2004, 2005 
Data, Measurement, and Model
The data for the empirical analysis and hypothesis tests come from 
Dependent Variable
For psychologists ambivalence is a well-known attitude dimension, which is typically accounted for by using two separate measures to gauge an individual's relationship to an attitude object (e.g. Cacioppo, Garner, and Berntson, 1997) . By measuring how much someone likes an object independently from how much someone dislikes the same object, one can differentiate between indifference (neither liking, nor disliking), a positive attitude (liking, but no disliking), a negative attitude (disliking, but no liking), and ambivalence (simultaneous liking and disliking). A respondent can answer that the EU means to her any one of these items or a combination of them, as there is no upper limit to how many items can be chosen.
Only 5.7% of respondents mention none of these 13 options. The meaning selected most often is the freedom to travel, study, and work anywhere in the EU. It was selected by 53.5% of the participants of the survey. Among the negative meanings of the EU to respondents, the modal answer was bureaucracy, which was mentioned by 23.3% (more details on the pattern of the answers can be found in appendix B2).
Based on their answers, respondents fall into one of four clearly distinguishable groups: (1) persons who attach none of the 13 labels to the EU, (2) respondents who attach both negative and positive meanings to the EU, (3) individuals for whom the EU only has positive meanings and (4) a group for whom the EU only has negative meanings. I code the first group as indifferent towards the EU. Following the conceptualization of ambivalence as a simultaneous presence of positive and negative considerations on an attitude object, I code group two as ambivalent towards the EU. The respondents in group three are considered to have positive views about the EU and the respondents in group four are coded as negative about the EU.
5
Based on this operationalization, the distribution of the dependent variable looks as follows. The EU has an exclusively positive connotation for 38.6% of the respondents and an exclusively negative meaning for 14.7%. The total share of indifferent respondents is 5.7%, while 41.0% are ambivalent. For the majority of ambivalent respondents (58.9%), the EU has three or less positive meanings as well as three or less negative meanings (appendix B1 provides more details on how conflicted ambivalent respondents are).
< Table 2 about here > those saying EU membership is "a good thing", "a bad thing", "neither/nor", or "don't know". For instance, 37.6 percent of respondents who find the EU membership of their country a bad thing are ambivalent, as well as almost 40 percent of those who find it a good thing. It is also noteworthy that nearly 50% of the respondents who selected the "neither/nor" category on the EU membership question actually have a one sided view on the EU (18.9% are negative and 27.6% are positive).
Independent Variables
Political sophistication is supposed to capture cognitive cue availability on the EU. It has a prominent role in explaining support for European integration and is operationalized in various ways in the literature. Inglehart's early contribution emphasizes the focal point of the concept, namely an individual's political skills (e.g. Inglehart, 1970) . He measures political skills using education and objective knowledge questions. American public opinion literature employs objective knowledge questions on political issues as a primary measurement instrument (e.g. Zaller, 1992; Dancey and Goren, 2010) . I use objective knowledge to capture political sophistication. Objective knowledge is tapped by four EU related knowledge questions and has the highest value when a respondent answers all questions correctly. Additionally, cue availability on the EU and sophistication is higher among citizens who regularly consume news media (e.g. De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006) . Hence, I include a variable for news media consumption. The variable is an index based on the frequency with which an individual attends to news on television, on the radio, and in newspapers.
The second hypothesis addresses the effect of party dissensus on European integration. Party dissensus is operationalized using a measure of dispersion. I calculate a mean EU orientation score for each country based on all parties in each member state and use the standard deviations on this mean for a regression analysis.
The standard deviation sums up in one figure the dissimilarity of party positions on European integration within each EU country. The Chapel Hill expert survey (Hooghe et al. 2010) Economic models of public opinion on European integration suggest that individuals for whom the EU entails more opportunities are more likely to be supporters of the integration process (Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel, 1998) . While the EU provides benefits like the free movement of labor and capital to managers, professionals, and wealthy citizens, it involves more risks for other citizens, such as low skilled workers. I control for occupational skills by using dummy variables and calculating an index of possessions as an instrument to capture wealth and income.
Additionally, Hooghe and Marks (2005) emphasize that subjective economic prospects matter and they differentiate between prospects for oneself and for one's country. I control for (subjective) national economic prospects and personal economic prospects.
Political orientations play a role for citizens' attitudes towards European integration (Ray, 2003; Steenbergen, Edwards, De Vries, 2007 
Summary Statistics
Summary statistics reveal the salient features of the individuals in the four different categories of the dependent variable (for details see Table A1 
Method
The data for this analysis is structured in two levels, with individuals being nested within countries. Respondents are likely to be more similar within countries than across countries, which can bias standard errors. Several independent variables vary only at the country level. I use a multilevel model in order to get correct standard errors for both individual and country level predictors. Because of the unordered character of the dependent variable, I estimate a multilevel multinomial logit regression model using Stata's gllamm routine.
Results
The results reveal an important difference between indifference and ambivalence towards the EU. Cognitive cues decrease indifference, but increase ambivalence. The availability of cognitive cues makes a univalent view of the EU less likely. Affective cues decrease both levels of indifference and ambivalence. A strong positive affect towards the EU makes individuals more likely to be univalently positive about the EU. 7 To examine these patterns in detail, I first comment on the raw coefficients of the multinomial logit model displayed in Table 3 . Then, I turn to predictive probabilities as a more accessible way to interpret the substantive meaning of the findings.
The estimated model explains a significant share of variance in the dependent variable. 8 The coefficients in Table 3 refer to a change in the probability that a respondent is in one of the response categories rather than in the reference group, namely ambivalence towards the EU. All independent predictors except the dummy variables are standardized and hierarchically centered. Thus, the coefficients refer to the effect of a standard deviation increase of an independent variable while all other variables are held at their means. For instance, the negative coefficients for elite division indicate that an increase in elite division makes it less likely for a respondent to be negative, positive, or indifferent about the EU and more likely for a respondent to be ambivalent. Specifically, a one-unit increase in elite division on the EU significantly decreases the logistic probability of a respondent being positive about the EU rather than ambivalent by .16 (second column, Table 3 ) and by .38 for someone to be ambivalent rather than indifferent (third column, Table 3 ). Hence, this perspective shows whether the gap between an individual being in a respective rather than a reference category increases or decreases. It does not reveal how an increase in an independent variable affects a respondents' (absolute) probability of being in a response category.
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Predicted probabilities show how an increase in an independent variable affects the probability for an individual to fall into one of the four categories of the dependent variable. This perspective puts the regression output on a more meaningful scale and therefore offers a more comprehensive evaluation of the effects. Table 4 presents the predicted probabilities that an individual will fall into each of the response categories based on the results from the model displayed in Table 3 . For a more intuitive interpretation of the results, I show the marginal effect of a two standard deviation increase in each of the key independent variables. The figures in Table 4 reveal the change in the predicted probabilities resulting from an increase in an independent variable from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean when all other variables are held at their means or reference categories. Figures 1 and 2 provide a graphic representation of these effects. The lines on each dot in these figures represent a 95% confidence interval of the effects.
< Table 3 The figures in Table 4 reveal that the marginal effect of a two standard deviation increase in EU knowledge is a decrease in the predicted probability that a respondent is indifferent about the EU by 55.8%. In contrast, EU knowledge increases the probability that a respondent is ambivalent about the EU by 7.5%. Cognitive cues from the news media have an analogous effect. A two standard deviation increase in news media consumption results in a drop of the probability for someone to be indifferent by 24.3 percent. The effect on the probability for a respondent to be ambivalent is an increase by 6.7 percent. Additionally, news media consumption makes respondents less likely to be positive about the EU. The same increase in news media consumption decreases the predicted probability for someone to be positive about the EU by 4.5 percent.
The results suggest that cognitive cue availability makes it difficult for Europeans to be indifferent towards the EU. However, this opinion does not necessarily need to be one sided. Rather, EU knowledge and news media consumption seem to provide EU citizens with cues that allow them to view the supranational institution from two different perspectives, a positive and a negative one. The data does not support a curvilinear relationship between cue availability and ambivalence. Table   4 show that a two standard deviation increase in elite division decreases the probability that a respondent is indifferent about the EU by 45.8%. Elite division also increases the probability of an individual being ambivalent by 16.5%. In countries in which party positions on European integration are more differentiated, the probability of a respondent having a positive view of the EU decreases. The theoretical expectation is that differences in party positions translate into a political debate. First, this is presumed to make it easier for citizens to form an opinion on the EU, making indifference less prevalent. Second, party dissent on European integration is assumed to provide individuals with competing cues and is therefore linked to higher levels of ambivalence and lower levels of univalent views on the EU. The analysis supports both explanations, although elite division is apparently more powerful in decreasing indifference than in increasing ambivalence.
In a nutshell, indifference results from a lack of cognitive cues on the EU.
Ambivalence appears to result from an abundance of cognitive cues and their conflict with each other. The availability of cognitive cues also makes individuals significantly less likely to have univalent views of the EU. This analysis examined three sources of such cues, namely EU specific knowledge, the news media, and elites. News media consumption and elite division both lead to lower levels of univalently positive views on the EU. This is in line with my theoretical expectation because both the news media and elites, when divided, are likely to provide conflicting cues on the EU to citizens. These results also have an interesting implication for the role of party politicization of EU politics, as politicization apparently increases the involvement of citizens. At the same time, however, politicization might not necessarily increase the public approval of European integration but spread ambivalence instead.
The effect of affective cues
Affective cues, quite in contrast to cognitive cues, decrease not only levels of indifference but also levels of ambivalence. The affective cues I focus on measure the extent of an individual's positive affect towards the EU, namely trust in EU institutions and attachment to the EU. These types of positive affect also decrease negative views of the EU. Specifically, positive affect is the strongest predictor for a univalently positive view of the EU.
Hypothesis three states that trust in EU institutions decreases indifference and ambivalence, while it increases positive views of the EU. The results confirm this expectation. Figure 2 reveals that the marginal effect of a two standard deviation increase in trust in EU institutions decreases the probability for a respondent to be indifferent about the EU by 44.7 percent. Furthermore, the same increase in trust also significantly reduces the probability of a respondent to be ambivalent about the EU by 10.8 percent.
Trust in EU institutions also has a strong effect on univalent views of the EU.
Specifically, it is a strong predictor for a positive view of the EU. The results relate directly to theories of support for European integration. The notion that public opinion on the EU is characterized by a dissensus rather than a permissive consensus is apparently correct (Hooghe and Marks, 2009 ). However, the constraining dissensus is not one that manifests itself only at the aggregate level.
Rather, future theorizing on the opinions of Europeans should recognize that dissensus on European integration exists in many citizens' minds.
The findings of this study have implications for future research on public attitudes towards European integration. In order to develop a precise understanding of the role of ambivalence, we first need better information. I employ a measure for ambivalence that provides only the first insight into the extent of individuals for whom the EU has a simultaneously positive and negative connotation. Research in psychology uses more elaborate tools to capture ambivalence (e.g. Kaplan, 1972; Thompson, Zanna, Griffin, 1995; Cacioppo, Gardner, Berntson, 1997) . The model presented in this paper can inform research analyzing how the Euro crisis affects EU public opinion. It underlines the importance of whether citizens perceive elites to be divided. Elite division over solutions to tackle the crisis could be a catalyst for rising levels of ambivalence towards the EU and a shrinking share of outright EU supporters. Given the significance of affective cues for attitudes towards the EU, it is also likely to be critical if the role of the EU in tackling the crisis contributes to higher For a more thorough treatment of the human decision making process, see for example Lau, 2003; Taber, 2003; Fiske and Taylor, 2010. 3 The authors provide an advance copy of their manuscript online at http://catherinedevries.eu/content/index.php?option=com_content&view=cate gory&layout=blog&id=13&Itemid=28 4
It would be preferable if the number of positive and negative items were the same. Since this cannot be changed, positive items have a greater probability of being chosen by a respondent. Thus, the figures for a positive view of the EU might be biased slightly upward, while those of a negative view can be biased downward. However, this is expected to have a negligible impact on the focus of the paper, which is ambivalence and indifference towards the EU. 5
To counter the argument that ambivalence might only be present if a respondent is torn between more than a single positive and negative consideration, I tested another coding. In another model (online appendix, Table A7 ), I coded respondents only as ambivalent if the EU has at least two positive and two negative meanings for her. This does not change the main pattern of the effects of cognitive and affective cues on indifference and ambivalence towards the EU. 6
Affective cues are measured with items explicitly gauging a respondent's feelings. The dependent variable is solely measured on the basis of cognitions, namely the meanings a respondent associates the EU with. This ensures that both instruments measure distinct concepts. Nevertheless, I cannot rule out the possibility that a citizens' level of trust in EU institutions is in part driven by her attitude towards the EU. My conceptualization reflects the notion that feelings are more quickly accessible than cognitions (e.g. Zajonc, 1984) , from which it would follow that affective cues are causally prior to an attitudinal stance on the EU (based on cognitions). This mirrors the dominant understanding in the EU public opinion literature according to which trust in EU institutions as well as an attachment to Europe are predictors for a citizens' attitude towards the EU rather than results of it (e.g. Carey, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; McLaren, 2007) . 7
The VIF scores for all independent level variables are below two, indicating that multicollinearity is not a critical issue. The exact figures can be found in the appendix. 8
This is confirmed by a likelihood ratio test. The deviance of an intercept only model is 46521.934, while the deviance of the full model is 42115.402. 9
The coefficients themselves do not show whether a variable makes an individual more or less likely to be in one of the four categories of the dependent variable. See Borooah (2002: 51) on this point: "…the direction of change in Pr (Y i =m) the probability of observing outcome j=m, for a small change in X ir cannot be inferred from the sign of β. The reason is that in a multinomial a change in the value of a variable for a particular person affects for him or her the probability for every outcome (…). Therefore in effect it depends not just upon the sign of β but also upon the size of that coefficient relative to the size of the other coefficients attached to the variable…". 10
In order to test for this possibility, I included squared terms of key independent variables in another version of the regression model (not displayed). This did not yield significant effects. -39.2 * p< 0.05; -1sd and +1sd: figures refer to predicted probabilities for a respondent to be in the respective categories when independent variable of interest is set to 1 standard deviation below its mean or 1 standard deviation above its mean and when all other variables are held at their means or reference categories; Δ and (SE): change in percentage points and standard error on this change in parentheses; Δ %: change in the predicted probabilities in percent (these figures are also shown in the rope ladder plots). 
(b) marginal effect of news media consumption
Figure 2. Effect of a change from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean of two independent variables on the predicted probabilities that a respondent is in each of the categories when all other variables are held at their means. The lines indicate the 95 % confidence interval. Web Appendix. Table A7 . Results of model with alternative coding: Respondents are coded as ambivalent only when they mention at least 2 positive and negative evaluations on the EU. Respondents who mention nothing or only one evaluation from each side are considered indifferent in this robustness check. All other respondents are coded as either positive about the EU or negative about the EU. The Table shows the effect of five independent variables on predicted probabilities as in Table 5 . -35.3 * p< 0.05; -1sd and +1sd: figures refer to predicted probabilities for a respondent to be in the respective categories when independent variable of interest is set to 1 standard deviation below its mean or 1 standard deviation above its mean and when all other variables are held at their means or reference categories; Δ and (SE): change in percentage points and standard error on this change in parentheses; Δ %: change in the predicted probabilities in percent (these figures are also shown in the rope ladder plots).
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